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THE SCOPE OF TESTIMONIAL IMMUNITY
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:
KASTIGAR v. UNITED STATES1
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."2  This privilege against self-incrimination can
be asserted in any proceeding-criminal, civil, administrative or in-
vestigatory.3 It provides the witness with a right to refuse to answer any
questions "that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a crim-
inal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used."4
It has been said that the privilege against self-incrimination "registers
an important advance in the development of our libertys-'one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.' "'5 The
privilege, however, has often been criticized because of its interference
with the government's power to compel witnesses to testify in court,
before grand juries and before governmental agencies." To overcome
this interference, legislation has been enacted permitting the government
to compel a witness to answer questions concerning criminal activities,
in exchange for which the witness is given protection (immunity) from
use of the testimony in criminal proceedings against him.7  The extent
of immunity that must be granted such a witness to avoid violation of
his Fifth Amendment privilege was the question presented to the United
States Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States.8
A federal grand jury in the Central District of California sub-
poenaed petitioners, Charles Joseph Kastigar and Michael Gorean
1. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. 406 U.S. at 444, citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964)
(White, J., concurring); McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); United States
v. Saline Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100, 104 (1828); cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273 (1968).
4. 406 U.S. at 445, citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951);
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
5. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956), quoting E. GRISWOLD, THE
Frn AMEmNDmENT TODAY 7 (1955).
6. L. MAYERs, SHALL WE AMEND THE FwFrH AMENDMENT? (1959); Friendly, The
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. ClN. L. Rav.
671 (1968).
7. See text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
8. 406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972).
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Stewart, to appear and testify on February 4, 1971. Believing that
they were apt to claim their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination,' the Government requested an order from the district
court compelling them to produce evidence and to answer questions
before the grand jury subject to a grant of immunity conferred pursuant
to sections 6002 and 6003 of Title 18 of the United States Code."0
Contesting the issuance of the order, petitioners claimed the limited
immunity granted by the statute was "not coextensive with the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore was not sufficient
to supplant the privilege and compel their testimony."" This argument
was rejected by the district court and the petitioners were ordered to
appear before the grand jury and to answer its questions.
12
Petitioners appeared but refused to answer any questions.'8 They
were again brought before the district court, where they persisted in
their refusal to answer the grand jury's questions.14  Finding both in
9. Id. at 442.
10. These sections are contained in Title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(1970) provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a com-
mittee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an
order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order
on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the wit-
ness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving false statement,
or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
18 U.S.C. § 6003 provides:
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or
provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the
United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court
for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United
States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testi-
mony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective
as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General,
the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, re-
quest an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary
to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
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contempt, the district court committed them to the Attorney General's
custody until they answered the questions or the grand jury term ex-
pired.' 5 The contempt order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit' 6 and the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari.17  The Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell for five mem-
bers of the Court, affirmed the lower court decisions. Justices Douglas
and Marshall dissented in separate opinions.'
8
Immunity statutes may be separated into three categories. Use
immunity statutes prohibit only the subsequent use of the compelled
testimony in criminal prosecutions against the witness.' 9 Use and
derivative use immunity statutes prohibit the subsequent use of compelled
testimony and any evidence derived from such testimony in criminal
prosecutions against the witness. 20  Transactional immunity statutes
prohibit the prosecution of the witness in regard to any matter relating
to which he testified.2'
The Kastigar majority held that the United States need only grant
15. Id. The contempt order was issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970), which
provides in part:
(a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or
grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with
an order of the court to testify or provide other information, including any book,
paper, document, record, recording or other material, the court, upon such refusal,
or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order his
confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give
such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement shall
exceed the life of-
(1) the court proceeding, or
(2) the term of the grand jury including extensions, before which such refusal
to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement
exceed eighteen months.
16. Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971).
17. 402 U.S. 971 (1971).
18. Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of the
case. 406 U.S. at 441.
19. A use immunity statute is exemplified by the Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12
Stat. 333, which provides:
mhe testimony of a witness examined and testifying before either House of
Congress . . . shall not be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against
such witness in any court of justice: Provided, however, That no official paper
or record, produced by such witness on such examination, shall be held or taken
to be included within the privilege of said evidence so to protect such witness
from any criminal proceeding as aforesaid ....
20. This is the form of immunity statute involved in Kastigar. See note 10 supra.
21. An example of a transactional immunity statute is the Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch.
83, 27 Stat. 443, whichprovides:
[No person shall be excused from attending and testifying .. . for the reason
that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may
tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person
shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to
its subpoena .... Id. at 443-44.
NOTES
immunity from the use of the compelled testimony and evidence derived
therefrom in a subsequent criminal prosecution-use and derivative
use immunity.2" Complete immunity from prosecution for the crimes
to which the testimony related was held not to be constitutionally re-
quired.23 Thus, a witness who refuses to testify because he believes
his answers might tend to incriminate him can be compelled to testify
and then be prosecuted by the same government for crimes relating to
his testimony.24 Justices Douglas and Marshall refused to condone
such a result. Justice Douglas reiterated his view that transactional
immunity, at the very least, is mandated by the requirements of the
Fifth Amendment. 5 Justice Marshall advanced the view that any grant
of immunity must put the witness "in precisely the same position, vis-
a-vis the government that has compelled his testimony, as he would have
been in had he remained silent in reliance on the [Fifth Amendment]
privilege. ' 26 The only way this may be accomplished as a practical
matter, in Justice Marshall's view, is through a grant of transactional
immunity.27
The petitioners in Kastigar initially asserted that the Fifth Amend-
ment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination deprives Congress
of any power to enact a law compelling a witness to testify about his
own allegedly illegal conduct, even if complete immunity from prosecu-
tion is given.2 8  Such an attack on immunity statutes in general is not
22. 406 U.S. at 453. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472
(1972), decided the same day, held the Kastigar decision to be applicable to state
immunity statutes as well.
23. 406 U.S. at 462.
24. But see note 185 infra.
25. 406 U.S. at 462-63, citing Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 549 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), and Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas has long maintained that immunity statutes
are per se unconstitutional. See text accompanying notes 50-67 infra.
26. 406 U.S. at 468.
27. Id. at 469. Justice Brennan is already on record as being opposed to the
adoption of use and derivative use immunity as the standard required by the Fifth
Amendment. He feels that transactional immunity is required to adequately replace
the privilege against self-incrimination. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 562
(1971) (dissenting opinion).
28. 406 U.S. at 448. "Incriminate" has two meanings which could result in different
interpretations of the Fifth Amendment. The first is that "incriminate" means "[tjo
charge with crime; to expose to an accusation or charge of crime; to involve oneself or
another in a criminal prosecution or the danger thereof." BLAcE's LAw DIcTIoNARY 908
(rev. 4th ed. 1968). The majority of the Court accept this as the meaning intended
by the writers of the Constitution, and therefore they feel the Constitution only pro-
hibits the compulsion of testimony resulting in a criminal prosecution. The second
interpretation is that "incriminate" means "to involve in, or make appear guilty of,
19731
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a new one. It was attempted unsuccessfully in Brown v. Walker"0 and
in Ullmann v. United States3 0 The Kastigar Court dismissed the peti-
tioners' argument in one sentence: "We find no merit to this contention
and reaffirm the decisions in Brown and Ullmann."3'
The weight of authority and history supports the Court's conclusion.
The privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the Fifth Amend-
ment had its origin in the oath ex officio32 which was established by
the ecclesiastical courts of England in 1236.11 Competing forces shaped
the development of the oath. On one side was the Church and its
desire to hold unrestricted inquiries into the behavior and morals of its
parishioners. On the other side was the sovereign and his wish to pro-
hibit Church officials from compelling incriminatory testimony from his
subjects. This conflict was resolved by the middle of the 18th Century
when the English judiciary gave effect to the privilege against self-in-
crimination. 34
The privilege was firmly established in the American colonies by
1789. The inequities resulting from forcing a person to incriminate
himself motivated the colonists to incorporate the provision in the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 5 Thus, the maxim nemo tenetur
seipsum accusare"6 "which in England was a mere rule of evidence
a crime or fault." Webster's New World Dictionary 1146 (Coll. ed. 1958). Similar
is Ballentine's Law Dictionary 605 (3rd ed. 1969) which reads "[tlo make it appear
that one is guilty of a crime." This is the interpretation apparently adopted by the peti-
tioners.
29. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
30. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
31. 406 U.S. at 448.
32. The oath required a person to answer all questions put to him by church of-
ficials without presentment or accusation. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949). See generally E. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); E. GRIsWoLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955);
8 J. WroMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 270 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE]; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 85-86 (1967) [herein-
after cited as ORGANIZED CRIME]; Note, 3 SETON HALL L. REv. 199, 200-01 (1971);
Note, Compulsory Immunity Legislation: Title 11 of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 1971 ILL. L. REV. 91, 92; Rief, The Grand Jury Witness and Compulsory
Testimony Legislation, 10 Am. CiM. L. REV. 829, 843-45 (1972).
33. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949).
34. For a more detailed discussion of the development of the privilege in the United
States, see Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763 (1935). See generally Corwin,
The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV.
191 (1930).
35. Note, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 199, 201 (1971).




became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional
enactment."37
Only a relatively short period of time elapsed after the development
of the privilege in England before various methods evolved to circum-
vent its impact.38 A notable example occurred in the Trial of Lord
Chancellor Macclesfield"9 in 1725. The Chancellor was accused of
trafficking in public offices. In order to obtain testimony against the
Chancellor from those who had collaborated with him, Parliament
passed an act to immunize the then Masters in Chancery from prosecu-
tion for their involvement. Once the criminality was taken away by
statute, it was felt that the privilege against self-incrimination was no
longer applicable.40 It was soon learned that the same result could be
achieved by granting royal pardons. This English tradition of bypassing
the privilege through "decriminalization" of the witness' conduct carried
over into the jurisprudence of the United States.4'
Grants of immunity, especially in such areas as the prosecution of
organized crime, are vitally important to our present system of law
enforcement.42 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the
effectiveness and often the necessity of immunity statutes in obtaining
the revelation of needed information in administrative, congressional
and judicial investigations.43
37. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896).
38. ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 32, at 86.
39. 16 How. St. Tr. 767, 921, 1147 (1725).
40. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
41. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2281, at 493. A brief history of American im-
munity legislation can be found in Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the
Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Developments and New Confusions, 10 ST. Louis
U.LJ. 327 (1966). See also Dixon, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Federal Im-
munity Statutes, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 447 (1954); Duncan, Federalism and the
Fifth: Configurations of Grants of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 561 (1965); OR-
GANIZED CRIME, supra note 32, at 86-88.
42. ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 32, at 80, points out:
Above all else, the testimony of witnesses is indispensable in the prosecution
of organized crime. The existing legal tools available to develop such testimony
need to be strengthened, and alternatives need to be sanctioned .... Immunity
grant and similar legislation must be broadened.
43. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-95 (1964) (concurring
opinion), Justice White observed:
Among the necessary and most important of the powers of the States as well as
the Federal Government to assure effective functioning of government in an
ordered society is the broad power to compel residents to testify in court or before
grand juries or agencies. . . . (Immunity statutes) have for more than a century
been resorted to for the investigation of many offenses, chiefly those whose proof
and punishment were otherwise impracticable. . . . This Court, in dealing with
federal immunity acts, has on numerous occasions characterized such statutes as
absolutely essential to the enforcement of various federal regulatory acts.
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Furthermore, the courts have recognized that testimony adverse to
the witness can be compelled in certain situations even without a grant
of immunity. This is based on the premise that, "if the testimony sought
cannot possibly be used as a basis for, or in aid of, a criminal prosecution
against the witness, the [Fifth Amendment] ceases to apply .... ,,44
The first of these situations is where prosecution for a crime is barred
by the statute of limitations.4 The second is where the witness has
already been convicted of the crime to which his testimony relates.40
The third is where a pardon has been granted to the witness.4 7  And the
fourth is where, although a crime has been committed, the penalty for
the offense has been repealed.4 8  The rationale for disallowing a claim
of the constitutional privilege in these situations is that the witness'
disclosure cannot prejudice him since he is no longer subject to criminal
prosecution.
49
Notwithstanding the long and consistent history of immunity statutes,
they have not been without critics. Although not the basis for his
dissent in Kastigar, Justice Douglas had previously indicated his belief
that no immunity grant is coextensive with the privilege against self-
incrimination. In his dissent in Ullmann v. United States 0 he pointed
out that there are three areas not covered by the immunity grant which
are shielded by absolute silence. First, the witness is not immune to
attempted prosecution: 51
[A]ll that can be said is, that the witness is not protected, by the pro-
See also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610
(1896).
44. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896).
45. Id. at 598.
46. In United States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957), the court of appeals
declared:
It is well established that once a witness has been convicted for the transactions in
question, he is no longer able to claim the privilege of the Fifth Amendment and
may be compelled to testify. Id. at 375.
47. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896).
48. Moore v. Backus, 78 F.2d 571, 577 (7th Cir. 1935).
49. See Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 800-02 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also
Moore v. Backus, 78 F.2d 571, 577 (7th Cir. 1935), wherein it was pointed out:
The rule is that if the offense is outlawed or pardoned, or the criminal liability
therefor has been removed by statutory enactment, then the interrogated party
cannot claim the constitutional protection.
50. 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956).
51. Id. at 443. In Kastigar, Justice Douglas considered the Fifth Amendment's re-
quirement that no one be compelled "to be a witness against himself" to mean no
person should be "compelled to admit guilt." To admit guilt for a criminal act and
open oneself to any shame therefrom is being a witness "against oneself." Under a
grant of any kind of immunity, the witness would be forced to admit his guilt and thus
Justice Douglas objects to all forms of immunity statutes. 406 U.S. at 467.
vision in question, from being prosecuted, but that he has been furnished
with a good plea to the indictment, which will secure his acquittal. But
is that true? Not unless the plea is sustained by competent evidence.
His condition, then, is that he has been prosecuted, been compelled, pre-
sumably, to furnish bail, and put to the trouble and expense of em-
ploying counsel and furnishing the evidence to make good his plea.
52
Thus, even if complete immunity from prosecution, is granted, the
testimony coerced from the witness may be used in an attempt to
prosecute him, and, even though the attempt should prove to be un-
successful, he would be forced to employ counsel, furnish bail, and be
put to numerous other expenses and inconveniences. This is less likely
to occur if no incriminating testimony is forced from the witness at all.
Justice Douglas concluded that "the privilege of silence is exchanged for
a partial, undefined, vague immunity. It means that Congress has
granted far less than it has taken away.5
5 3
However, fear of prosecution is a harm which is not recognized by
the law. The possibility exists that any person, no matter how innocent,
may be confronted with a civil or criminal prosecution and be put
to the inconvenience and expense of defending himself. The person
has no remedy against the prosecutor unless the prosecution was
malicious, except insofar as he may recover his court costs. 54
The second area felt by Justice Douglas to be not fully protected by
immunity statutes is the witness' "conscience and human dignity and
freedom of expression."5  Prying open the lips of an accused violates
the witness' conscience and should be prohibited. It was argued by
Justice Field, dissenting in Brown, that there is an "essential and in-
herent cruelty" in forcing self-accusation.5" There has been no real
response to this suggestion. The majority opinions in Brown and Ull-
mann apparently rejected it by simply ignoring it. Perhaps such an
argument could be made whenever a man is forced to do anything con-
trary to his will or desire, which would encompass virtually every law
that has been made. And the Sixth Amendment 17 specifically provides
52. 350 U.S. at 443-44, quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 621 (1896) (Shiras,
J., dissenting).
53. 350 U.S. at 445.
54. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896); see 8 WIGMORE, supra note 32,
§ 2281, at 494.
55. 350 U.S. at 445.
56. 161 U.S. at 637.
57. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .. . . U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
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that a person may be compelled to be a witness against another, even
if his conscience tells him that he should not testify.
8
The final argument against immunity statutes raised by Justice
Douglas in Ullmann is based on the theory that the privilege against
self-incrimination "protect[s] the accused from all compulsory testimony
'which would expose him to infamy and disgrace,' as well as that which
might lead to a criminal conviction." 59 This view prevailed in England
as early as 1696, when Lord Chief Justice Treby declared that "no man is
bound to answer any questions that will subject him to a penalty, or to
infamy."60  This same thesis was advanced by District Judge Grosscup
in United States v. James.61 In reviewing the "history of the reign of
intolerance that once ruled England, the contests between the Church
and State, and the cruelties of some of the old legal procedures,""2 Judge
Grosscup made the following statement regarding the aims of the
Framers in drafting the Fifth Amendment:
Did they originate such privilege simply to safeguard themselves against
the law-inflicted penalties and forfeitures? Did they take no thought of
the pains of practical outlawry? The stated penalties and forfeitures of
the law might be set aside; but was there no pain in disfavor and odium
among neighbors, in excommunication from church or societies that
might be governed by the prevailing views, in the private liabilities that
the law might authorize, or in the unfathomable disgrace, not susceptible
of formulation in language, which a known violation of law brings upon
the offender? Then, too, if the immunity was only against the law-in-
flicted pains and penalties, the government could probe the secrets of
every conversation, or society, by extending compulsory pardon to one
of its participants, and thus turn him into an involuntary informer. Did
the framers contemplate that this privilege of silence was exchangeable
always, at the will of the government, for a remission of the participant's
own penalties, upon a condition of disclosure, that would bring those to
whom he had plighted his faith and loyalty within the grasp of the pro-
secutor? I cannot think so.
63
Under this view, although a witness' compelled testimony may not lead
58. The fact that a person may be compelled to be a witness, however, does not
preclude the refusal of the witness to answer questions on the ground of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
59. 350 U.S. at 449, quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 631 (1896) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
60. 350 U.S. at 453, quoting Trial of Freind, 13 How. St. Tr. 1, 17 (1696) (emphasis
added).
61. 60 F. 257 (N.D. Ill. 1894).
62. 350 U.S. at 449 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63. 60 F. at 264.
[Vol. 6
1973] NOTES
to a criminal prosecution or conviction, it nonetheless may lead to the
infliction of "punishment." Justice Douglas maintained that the history
of infamy as punishment is well known and that the loss of office or
dignity was a common feudal form of punishment: 64 "Infamy was
historically considered to be punishment as effective as fine and im-
prisonment.""6  In Justice Douglas' view, expressed in his dissent in
Ullmann, the above described attitude towards infamy "was part of
the background of the Fifth Amendment'66 and was explicitly written
into the privilege against self-incrimination by the reference, in the first
clause of the Fifth Amendment, to holding a person for "a capital or
otherwise infamous crime," considered along with the clause relating to
being a "witness against himself." This, according to Justice Douglas,
"reflects the revulsion of society at the infamy imposed by the state."1
67
64. 350 U.S. at 450-51; see Franklin, Encyclopddiste Origin of the Fifth Amendment,
15 LAW. GuiLD REv. 41 (1955).
65. 350 U.S. at 451. The use of infamy as a sanction in Roman law is described
in Tatarczuk, Infamy of Law, in CANON LAW STUDIES No. 357, 1-13 (The Catholic
University of America 1954).
66. 350 U.S. at 451.
67. Id. at 452. Another argument advanced against immunity statutes has been
that there are many "disabilities" that attach to a person who is compelled to testify
as to his criminal activities and that these disabilities are forfeitures which are within
the protection of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 350
U.S. at 440-41. As stated in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), "[a] wit-
ness . . . is protected by the law from being compelled to give evidence that tends
to incriminate him, or subject his property to forfeiture." Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
The case of Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), provides an example
of the punishing effect that such disabilities can have on a witness who is compelled
to testify, even though his testimony does not lead to a prosecution or a conviction.
In Ullmann, the witness was asked various questions by the grand jury relating to his
membership in the Communist Party. When he invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination, the United States Attorney granted him transactional immunity pursuant
to the terms of the Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C, § 3486 (1954). Regardless of
whether the witness' testimony tended to incriminate him, various disabilities, -created
by federal law, attached to him if he admitted that he was a Communist. These dis-
abilities included "ineligibility for employment in the federal government and in de-
fense plants" (50 U.S.C. § 784 (1970)) and the possibility of being interned (id.
§ 785). If such disabilities are forfeitures they would come within the protection of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, a witness should not be
compelled to testify when such disabilities would result. Justice Douglas felt these
disabilities to be forfeitures and thus as much protected against by the Fifth Amend-
ment as criminal prosecutions. 350 U.S. at 440-41.
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the United States Supreme Court
said that compelling a witness to disclose evidence that tends to subject his property
to forfeiture
is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts
of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit
the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political
liberty and personal freedQm. Id, at 632,
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The existing law, however, is firmly established that the mere fact
that immunity statutes "fail to shield the witness against the personal
disgrace that often is an incident of the revelation of one's connections
with a crime, does not render the immunity inadequate in a constitutional
sense."' 8 Wigmore has suggested that such a view as that adopted by
Justice Douglas ignores "the independence in principle, in details, and
in history" of the privilege against disclosure of facts involving disgrace
and the privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege against
forced disclosure of disgraceful or infamous facts became recognized
after and independently of the privilege against self-incrimination. Its
limitations were entirely distinct, neither covering facts tending merely
to disclose infamy, nor applying to facts material to the issues. It only
applied to facts which absolutely would disclose infamy and which
were collateral facts, facts solely affecting credibility.609
Since before the turn of the century, immunity statutes per se have
been upheld as being constitutionally permissible.70 The Kastigar Court
noted that prior to the enactment of 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 over fifty
federal immunity statutes were in force and that every state had one
or more such statutes. 71  Thus the Court concluded that "such statutes
have 'become part of our constitutional fabric.' ",72
Having failed to persuade the Court that immunity statutes are per
se unconstitutional, the petitioners next contended that the "use and
derivative use" immunity provided by 18 U.S.C. § 6002 "is not co-
extensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, and therefore is not sufficient to supplant
the privilege and compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. '73
They relied heavily on Counselman v. Hitchcock74 to support their argu-
Justice Douglas suggested that "[t]he forfeiture of property on compelling testimony
is no more abhorrent than the forfeiture of the rights of citizenship," the right to a
job, the right to a passport or the right to not be subject to the risk of internment.
He also stated that "[w]hen a man loses a job because he is a Communist, there is as
much a penalty suffered as when an importer loses property because he is a tax evader."
350 U.S. at 442.
68. Smithy. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
69. 8 WIr oRE, supra note 32, § 2255, at 332.
70. See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968); Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956);
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S.
131, 142 (1913); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
71. 406 U.S. at 447.
72. Id., quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
73. 406 U.S. at 448.
74. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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ment. Counselman was the first Supreme Court case in which a con-
stitutional challenge to an immunity statute was examined. Counsel-
man, a dealer in grain, was questioned by the Interstate Commerce
Commission regarding rate rebates. He invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination and was granted immunity by the Commission pur-
suant to an 1868 statute providing for immunity only from the use of
the specific testimony compelled from -the witness-use immunity."m
Notwithstanding the grant of immunity, Counselman continued his
refusal to answer questions and was convicted of contempt of court. On
review, the Counselman Court found the statute to be too narrow to
supplant the privilege against self-incrimination because it could not
"prevent the use of the witness' testimony to search out other testimony to
be used in evidence against him . . . .,, The Court could have limited
its decision to its finding that the witness was not protected from the use
of the fruits of his testimony, striking down the immunity statute involved
on that basis alone. However, the Court, noting that for an immunity
statute to be upheld it must afford a protection that is coextensive with
the privilege,7T concluded:
[The immunity statute] does not supply a complete protection from all
the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to
guard, and is not a full substitute for that prohibition. In view of the
constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford
immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question
relates.78
75. 142 U.S. at 560-61. The immunity statute, Revised Statutes, pt. 1, § 860, 18
Stat. 163 (1878), provided that:
No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a party or a
witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this or any foreign country, shall be
given in evidence, or in any manner used against him or his property or estate,
in any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or for the enforce-
ment of any penalty or forfeiture: Provided, That this section shall not exempt
any party or witness from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in
discovering or testifying as aforesaid.
76. 142 U.S. at 564.
77. Id. at 565.
78. Id. at 585-86 (emphasis added). Although Counselman was the first time the
United States Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a compulsory testimony
statute, this issue had been raised in several state court proceedings. The state court
decisions were split between those that upheld the constitutionality of use immunity
statutes, (e.g., People v. Kelly, 124 N.Y. 74 (1861); Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153
(1860); Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184 (1887); State v. Quanlos, 13 Ark. 307 (1853))
and those that held that immunity statutes providing immunity from only the use of
the compelled testimony, and not from the fruits derived therefrom, were constitu-
tionally insufficient for failing to provide for complete immunity from prosecution for
the crimes disclosed by the compelled testimony (e.g., State v. Norwell, 58 N.H.
314 (1878); Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 624 (1873); Emery's Case,
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In response to the standard of "absolute immunity" enunciated in
Counselman, Congress enacted a new immunity statute.70  This statute
granted immunity from prosecution rather than mere immunity from
use or derivative use of the compelled testimony.80 The constitutionality
of the statute was barely sustained in Brown v. Walker,81 and it became
the basic form for the numerous federal immunity statutes until 1970
when Congress enacted the statute involved in Kastigar.
The Kastigar majority, however, swept aside the "absolute immunity"
language in Counselman by characterizing it as dicta.82  There are
statements in Counselman itself which support such a view. Justice
Blatchford, writing for the majority, had enumerated the problems in
the statute before the Court:
It could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search
out other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property,
in a criminal proceeding in such court. It could not prevent the obtain-
ing and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable
directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which
he might be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer,'
he could not possibly have been convicted. 83
These statements and other similar statements, together with the fact
that Counselman had involved a mere use immunity statute, do tend to
weaken the authority of Counselman's absolute immunity language.
Nevertheless, both Congress and the courts, until recently, apparently
felt that the absolute immunity language was the essence of the Counsel-
107 Mass. 172 (1871)). After noting (142 U.S. at 563-85) the existence of this dichot-
omy in the state courts, the Counselman Court explicitly chose to follow the line of de-
cisions requiring transactional immunity. It would not appear the Court was aware
of the middleground afforded by use and derivative use immunity, but rather con-
ceived of transactional immunity as the only alternative to use immunity.
79. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. It was argued at the introduction
of the bill that enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act would be impossible in
the absence of an effective immunity statute. The bill was drafted specifically to meet
the broad language in Couselman. See 23 CONG. REc. 573, 633 (1892); 24 CONG.
Rac. 503 (1893).
80. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. See note 21 supra. This statute
was repealed by section 245 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, tit. II, § 245 (Oct. 15, 1970).
81. 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The four dissenting justices contended that even trans-
actional immunity was not broad enough to be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege. Since Brown, however, the principle that government can use an immunity
grant to compel incriminating testimony has not been successfully challenged. E.g.,
Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 (1956).
82. 406 U.S. at 454-55.
83. 142 U.S. at 564.
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man decision. For example, in Hale v. Henkel,"4 the transactional
immunity standard was upheld because it removed the criminality (the
threat of prosecution) and "if the criminality has already been taken
away, the [Fifth] amendment ceases to apply."8 5  In McCarthy v.
Arndsten,s6 Justice Brandeis declared that the privilege against self-
incrimination was still available to the witness because the statute in-
volved failed "to afford complete immunity from prosecution. ' st In
United States v. Murdock,s8 the Court remarked that "full and complete
immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the wit-
ness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule
against compulsory self-incrimination."89  Similarly, the Court declared
in United States v. Monia90 that Counselman "indicated clearly that
nothing short of absolute immunity would justify compelling the witness
to testify if he claimed the privilege" against self-incrimination. 91
The Kastigar Court, however, disposed of such statements in the same
way that it had disposed of the language in Counselman itself by noting
that none of the cases had involved a use and derivative use immunity
statute.92 Hale and Monia concerned statutes which provided for full
transactional immunity.9" Murdock involved an attempt to invoke the
Fifth Amendment to prevent self-incrimination under state law94 prior to
the time the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states. 95
The statute in McCarthy afforded no immunity whatsoever.96 Other
cases employing the Counselman language were distinguished on similar
grounds.97  In essence, Justice Powell was able to bypass decades of
adherence to the transactional immunity standard enunciated in Coun-
selman because the clear import of the language in Counselman had
dissuaded Congress from attempting to devise an immunity statute
84. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
85. Id. at 67.
86. 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
87. Id. at 42.
88. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
89. Id. at 149.
90. 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
91. Id. at 428; see Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S.
70, 81 (1965); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 182 (1954); Smith v. United States,
337 U.S. 137, 146 (1949).
92. 406 U.S. at 455 n.39.
93. Id.
94. 284 U.S. at 149.
95. More precisely, Murdock involved a challenge to the "silver-platter doctrine"
discussed in the text accompanying notes 102-07 infra.
96. 266 U.S. at 42.
97. 406 U.S. at 455 n.39. Most of the cases are listed in note 91 supra.
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which provided for anything less than full transactional immunity. 8
The factual situations after Counselman thus either involved trans-
actional immunity statutes enacted subsequent to Counselman, use
immunity statutes enacted prior to Counselman, or statutes, whenever
enacted, which failed to provide any immunity at all. By a strange twist
of fate, the great deference accorded to the Counselman absolute im-
munity language eventually proved to be its undoing, as it left the
precise question of the constitutionality of use and derivative use im-
munity open for decision eighty years later by a Court with quite dif-
ferent notions concerning immunity legislation. The Kastigar Court
was free to conclude that:
The statute's explicit proscription of the use in any criminal case of
"testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any in-
formation directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other in-
formation)" is consonant with Fifth Amendment standards. We hold
that such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is suffi-
cient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant
of immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by
the privilege, it need not be broader. . . . [Use and derivative use im-
munity] prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled
testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony can-
not lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.00
Justice Powell relied on Murphy v. Waterfront Commission0" for
authority for the proposition that use and derivative use immunity is
not per se unconstitutional. In Murphy, the petitioners refused to
answer certain questions in a hearing conducted by the bi-state Water-
front Commission of New York Harbor.'' They were granted com-
plete immunity from prosecution under the laws of New York and New
Jersey. But the petitioners continued their refusal, arguing that the
states' grant of immunity would not prevent their testimony from being
used by federal authorities, and they were subsequently adjudged to be
98. In the seventy-eight years between Counselman and the enactment or 18 U.s.C.
§§ 6002-03 in 1970, Congress enacted approximately seventy immunity provisions into
various federal statutes and, with few exceptions, every provision has provided for
nothing less than transactional immunity. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 replaced substantially
all of these immunity statutes. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 202-58 (Oct. 15, 1970).
99. 406 U.S. at 453.
100. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
101. The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor is a bistate body established
under an interstate compact between New York and New Jersey and approved by Con-
gress. 67 Stat. 541 (1953).
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in civil and criminal contempt. 10 2 The petitioners fears were based on
prior Court decisions which had upheld the delivery "on a silver platter"
of self-incriminating statements compelled by a state, with or without a
grant of immunity (the Fifth Amendment not yet having been held
applicable to the states), to federal authorities for use in a federal
criminal proceeding against the witness. 10 3
The continued viability of this "silver platter" doctrine was question-
able following the Court's decision in Ivalloy v. Hogan,0 4 which held
the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 5 The Murphy Court did away with the doctrine and held
that, once New York and New Jersey had granted immunity to the
witness, the federal government could not use the compelled testimony
or its fruits against him.106  Significantly, however, the Court ruled
that the federal authorities could still prosecute the witness for a federal
crime related to the transaction for which New York and New Jersey
had granted transactional immunity if the federal prosecution was based
upon completely independent evidence.1
0 7
The Kastigar majority recognized that Murphy, unlike the present
case, did not .involve a situation where the jurisdiction seeking to
compel the testimony had granted only use and derivative use immu-
nity.'0 8 Nevertheless, the Court pointed out, the Murphy decision had
allowed the Fifth Amendment privilege to be supplanted by what was
in effect use and derivative use immunity insofar as the non-compelling
jurisdiction was concerned. Theoretically, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that should hold the compelling jurisdiction to any broader
standard:
[B]oth the reasoning of the Court in Murphy and the result reached
compel the conclusion that use and derivative use immunity is constitu-
tionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.
Since the privilege is fully applicable and its scope is the same whether
invoked in a state or federal jurisdiction, the Murphy conclusion that a
prohibition on use and derivative use secures a witness' Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against infringement by the Federal Government dem-
onstrates that immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with
102. 378 U.S. at 52-54.
103. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141 (1931).
104. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
105. Id. at 6.
106. 378 U.S. at 79-80.
107. Id. at 79.
108. 406 U.S. at 457.
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the scope of the privilege.... This protection coextensive with the
privilege is the degree of protection which the Constitution requires,
and is all that the Constitution requires even against the jurisdiction
compelling testimony by granting immunity.109
Justice Douglas, in his dissent, objected to the Kastigar majority's
reliance on Murphy as authority for undercutting the absolute immunity
language used in Counselman and its progeny. He argued that the
immunity standard approved in Murphy was the result of consideration
of a problem entirely different than the one posed in Counselman:
Counselman, as the Murphy Court recognized, "said nothing about
the problem of incrimination under the law of another sovereign." That
problem is one of federalism, as to require transactional immunity be-
tween jurisdictions might "deprive a state of the right to prosecute a
violation of its criminal law on the basis of another state's grant of im-
munity [a result which] would be gravely in derogation of its sovereignty
and obstructive of its administration of justice." 110
As Justice White's concurring opinion in Murphy had clearly pointed out,
serious federal-state problems would be created if the Fifth Amend-
ment were held to require immunity from prosecution in one jurisdiction
because a witness had been compelled, under grant of immunity, to
testify in another jurisdiction."' Since states are without authority to
grant immunity from federal prosecution, a rule requiring transactional
immunity would invalidate the immunity statutes of the fifty states in
any case where there was a possibility of federal prosecution. Justice
White had explained that:
[Transactional immunity] would not only require widespread federal
immunization from prosecution in federal investigatory proceedings of
persons who violated state criminal laws, regardless of the needs or
wishes of local law enforcement officials, but would also deny the States
the power to obtain information necessary for state law enforcement and
state legislation.
1" 2
Such a drastic result, Justice White had concluded, should not be imposed
on the noncompelling jurisdiction, which has had absolutely no say in
determining whether or not the desired testimony is worth an absolute
grant of immunity, unlike the situation where only a single jurisdiction
is involved:
109. Id. at 458-59 (footnotes omitted).
110. Id. at 463-64 (citations omitted), quoting United States ex rel. Catena v.
Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1971).
111. 378 U.S. at 92.
112. Id. at 93.
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[Where there is only one government involved, be it state or federal,
not only is the danger of prosecution more imminent and indeed the
likely purpose of the investigation to facilitate prosecution and convic-
tion, but that authority has the choice of exchanging immunity for the
needed testimony." 3
Justice Douglas further contended that proof that Murphy was not
intended to undercut Counselman or modify -the transactional immunity
standard in cases involving only one jurisdiction might be seen in
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board,1 4 decided one year
after Murphy by essentially the same Court." 5 In Albertson, -the Court
unanimously held that section 4(f) of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950"" was unconstitutional, using the following analysis:
In Counselman v. Hitchcock, decided in 1892, the Court held "that no
[immunity] statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecu-
tion after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have
the effect of supplanting the privilege. . . ," and that such a statute is
valid only if it supplies "a complete protection from all the perils against
which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard . . ." by
affording "absolute immunity against future prosecution for the of-
fense to which the question relates." Measured by these standards, the
immunity granted by § 4(f) is not complete.1
7
The Alberston language does strongly support Justice Douglas' position.
Unfortunately, however, as with the other cases previously discussed
which contained such statements,"18 the language is dicta insofar as the
question of use and derivative use immunity is concerned, since the
statute invalidated in Albertson granted mere use immunity." 9 The
Kastigar majority thus did not find it difficult to dismiss the Albertson
decision.'
20
It would seem that Justice Douglas is probably correct in asserting
that the existence of extremely difficult federal-state problems was the
overriding reason the Murphy Court held that only use and derivative
use immunity was required to be imposed on a non-compelling jurisdic-
113. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
114. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
115. The only difference in the Court was that in the intervening period Justice
Goldberg resigned and was replaced by Justice Fortas.
116. Subversive Activities Control Act, ch. 1024, § 4(f), 64 Stat. 992 (1950), as
amended, 50 U.S.C. § 783(f) (1970).
117. 382 U.S. at 80 (citations omitted and emphasis added), quoting Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
118. See text accompanying notes 92-99 supra.
119. 382 U.S. at 80.
120. 406 U.S. at 455 n.39,
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tion in multi-jurisdictional cases. The opinion in Murphy gave no
indication that the transactional immunity standard would no longer
be applicable when a federal witness was compelled to testify as to
criminal activities which could be the subject of a federal prosecution.
In fact, Justice White recognized that the Court was not deciding this
question:
Whatever may be the validity [of the transactional immunity language
in Counselman] where the witness is being investigated by a grand jury
for the purpose of indictment for a particular offense and where the
grand jury proceedings are conducted by the same government at-
tempting-to obtain a conviction for the offense-the facts of Counsel-
man-it clearly has no validity . . . where the inquiry does not con-
cern any federal offense, no less a particular one, and the government
seeking the testimony has no purpose or authority to prosecute for
federal crimes.
121
Nevertheless, even if the Murphy Court did not intend to affect the
Counselman transactional immunity standard (an assumption which is
difficult to avoid given the Court's subsequent language in Albertson),
it did give constitutional approbation to a use and derivative use standard
of immunity. Theoretically, therefore, it is difficult to argue with the
Kastigar majority's extension of this narrower standard to the single
jurisdiction situation-if the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use
of the standard in the multi-jurisdictional context, why should it be
violated by the use of the standard in the single jurisdiction context?
22
Having established a theoretical justification for the allowance of a
use and derivative use immunity statute, the Kastigar majority finally
turned to the petitioners' most forceful argument, the argument that, as
a practical matter, use and derivative use immunity could not adequately
protect them from various possible incriminating uses of the com-
pelled testimony. The petitioners argued that such subtle uses as
"obtaining leads, names of witnesses or other information not otherwise
available" would be unsusceptible to proof by testimony or cross-ex-
amination, especially where the prosecuting jurisdiction granted the
immunity.
123
121. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 106 (1964) (White, J., con-
curring).
122. The Court may have intended to retreat somewhat from its unequivocal asser-
tion that Murphy "compelled" the result reached in Kastigar (406'-U.S. at 458) when
it suggested that "an analysis of prior decisions . . . indicates that use and derivative-
use immunity is coextensive with the privilege." Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 459.
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The majority opinion rejected these arguments. 1 2 4  It maintained
that the statute, in its literal terms, met constitutional requirements. The
statute provides:
[N]o testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case
125
The Court referred to this statute as a "comprehensive safeguard," pro-
hibiting the introduction of the witness' compelled testimony or any evi-
dence directly or indirectly derived therefrom at a subsequent trial. The
Court maintained that this prohibition explicitly barred, among other
things, "the use of compelled testimony as an 'investigatory lead,' and
. . . the use of any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a
witness as a result of his compelled disclosure."'-"
The Court also asserted that a witness given immunity under the
statute would not be "dependent for the preservation of his rights
upon the integrity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities."' 7
Jusice Powell reaffirmed the standard for enforcement that was laid down
in Murphy:
Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant
of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal
authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted
by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the
disputed evidence.
1.2 8
This burden of proof cannot be met merely by the government's as-
sertion that the evidence sought to be used is untainted. Rather, the
prosecution is required to show affirmatively that its evidence is "derived
from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testi-
mony. 1120 Stressing the inviolability of this prohibition, Justice Powell
concluded that use and derivative use immunity "leaves the witness and
the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the
witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege.'
' 3 0
Justice Marshall disagreed. He did not contest the majority's con-
clusion that use and derivative use immunity is theoretically sufficient.
124. Id. at 459-61.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970); see note 10 supra.
126. 406 U.S. at 460.
127. Id.
128. Id., quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 79 n.18.
129. 406 U.S. at 460.
130. Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
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However, in practice, such a standard would not insure that the witness
would be left in the precise position he would have been in had he
remained silent.131  Contrary to the majority's conclusion, Justice
Marshall argued that the efficacy of the use prohibition was inextricably
tied to the "good faith" of the prosecutorial authorities:
The information relevant to the question of taint is uniquely within the
knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. They alone are in a position
to trace the chains of information and investigation that lead to the evi-
dence to be used in a criminal prosecution. A witness who suspects
that his compelled testimony was used to develop a lead will be hard
pressed indeed to ferret out the evidence necessary to prove it. And
of course it is no answer to say he need not prove it, for though the
Court puts the burden of proof on the government, the government will
have no difficulty in meeting its burden by mere assertion if the witness
produces no contrary evidence. The good faith of the prosecuting
authorities is thus the sole safeguard of the witness' rights.'8 2
131. Id. at 468.
132. Id. at 469. A defendant's opportunity to prove derivative use is seriously
impeded by his lack of access to most of the relevant information on the issue of taint
because the prosecution alone knows the origins of its evidence. Other than being
entitled to any exculpatory or mitigating evidence that the prosecution possesses (Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)), a defendant in a criminal case does not have a
constitutional right to discovery regarding the prosecution's case against him. Camp-
bell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961). This is to preserve the adversary climate
of the proceedings so that the ultimate truth will be revealed and will prevail. FED.
R. Ciwu. P. 16(a)(3) provides that the defendant has a right to a copy of his own
grand jury testimony. He has no right to the full grand jury transcript. However,
upon a showing of "particularized need" the federal courts may permit the defendant
to inspect the entire transcript. Despite the recent expansion of a defendant's right
to discovery in the federal courts provided by FED. R. Cram. P. 16, the defendant's
task of finding evidence of derivative use will not be facilitated because of the ex-
emption proviso of section 16(b): ". . . this rule does not authorize the discovery
or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made
by government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case,
or of statements made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses
(other than the defendant) to agents of the government . .. ."
It is possible, however, that the Jencks rule would be of some assistance to a de-
fendant attempting to find out if any tainted use was made of his immunized testimony.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3500, a codification of the decision in the case of Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The Jencks rule provides an exception to the general
rule that in non-capital cases the government need not disclose its witnesses' identifica-
tion nor the contents of any statements made by them prior to trial. After a govern-
ment witness actually testifies at the defendant's trial, the prosecutor must allow the
defendant, for purposes of cross-examination, to inspect that witness' pretrial testimony.
Therefore, if the government calls before the court any witnesses or investigative agents
for the purpose of assisting the government in meeting its burden of proof of showing




Justice Marshall further maintained that, even assuming the good
faith of the prosecuting authorities, use and derivative use immunity is
inadequate to guard against unknowing uses of the compelled testimony.
What may appear to be independently derived evidence could be the
direct result of a prohibited use concealed somewhere within the in-
stitutionalized investigative and prosecutorial apparatus.' 33 To illustrate
this point, he reminded the majority of the factual circumstances which
had led to the Court's decisions in Santobello v. New York 134 and
Giglio v. United States.13 5  In Santobello, the defendant entered a plea
of guilty in exchange for the prosecuting attorney's promise that he would
not make a recommendation to the judge as to the sentence to be im-
posed. However, a different prosecuting attorney appeared to try the
case and, being unaware of his colleague's commitment, recommended
Moreover, the defendant may possibly be able to gain complete access to the
government's files under the doctrine laid down in the decision of Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). The Court in that case stated:
The trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused
to.prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was the fruit of the
poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince
the trial court that its proof had an independent origin. Id. at 183, quoting
Nordone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
In Alderman, the defendant was convicted and he subsequently discovered that the
government had used wiretaps in investigating his case. The Court remanded the case
to the district court to determine the legality of the wiretap. The Court directed that,
if the lower court found that the wiretaps were illegal, the government would have to
turn over to the defendant all of its records regarding the surveillance so that he could
ascertain whether any of the evidence introduced by the government at the trial was
related to the information acquired by the wiretap.
The immediate question concerns the applicability of the Alderman rule to im-
munity cases like Kastigar. In both situations, the government must build its case on in-
dependently derived evidence. In the wiretap situation, the government cannot use
any evidence obtained by an unconstitutional wiretap. In immunity cases, the govern-
ment cannot use the witness' compelled testimony nor any evidence derived therefrom.
In either situation the defendant can have evidence excluded from the case by
showing that it is related to the illegal wiretap (in surveillance cases) or related to his
compelled testimony (in immunity cases). Unless the defendant is to rely on the
good faith of the prosecuting authorities (an assumption specifically rejected by the
Kastigar Court), it would seem that he must be given access to the relevant records
if he is to be able to prove prohibited conduct. Thus, in Alderman, the government
was required to produce its surveillance records for the inspection of the defendant.
Presumably, the defendant in immunity cases should have equal access to the prosecu-
tion's records in order to argue against the government's assertion of an independent
origin for the evidence that was produced at trial. Otherwise, the defendant would be
deprived of the only source of information relevant to contesting the government's
assertion.
133. 406 U.S. at 469.
134. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
135. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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the maximum sentence. 30 The Court concluded that the "interests of
justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution"
compelled the remand of the case for the state court to decide whether to
specifically enforce the plea agreement or to allow the defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea.137 In Giglio, the defendant was convicted
almost entirely on the basis of a co-conspirator's testimony. The de-
fendant and the prosecuting attorney were without knowledge of the fact
that this testimony had been solicited pursuant to a promise of im-
munity given by another government attorney at the time of the grand
jury investigation. The Court, in reversing and ordering a new trial,
held that this inadvertent suppression of material evidence violated
due process.' 38 Both Santobello and Giglio involved situations in which
a prosecutor had infringed a defendant's rights by utilizing the prior work
of another prosecutor in the same office without an adequate knowl-
edge of the circumstances surrounding the development of that prior
work and the limitations imposed on its use. Such situations are likely
to occur much more often and to be much less detectable when the
source of evidence is in dispute. Accordingly, Justice Marshall con-
cluded that only transactional immunity could provide the required
margin of protection when a single jurisdiction is involved.
However, Justice Marshall recognized that the practical considera-
tions might vary in the multi-jurisdictional setting: "This case does
not, of course, involve the special considerations that come into play
when the prosecuting government is different from the government that
has compelled the testimony.' 30  Justice White, in his concurring
opinion in Murphy, had suggested that unknowing and subtle uses
would not readily occur where the questioning jurisdiction differs from
the prosecuting jurisdiction since "[aiccess and use require misconduct
and collusion, a matter quite susceptible of proof."' 40
136. 404 U.S. at 259.
137. Id. at 262-63. Interestingly, the Court in reaching this result stated:
The staff lawyers in a prosecutor's office have the burden of "letting the left hand
know what the right hand is doing" or has done. That the breach of agreement
was inadvertent does not lessen its impact. Id. at 262.
138. 405 U.S. at 152. The Court dismissed the government's argument that the
promise was given without authority and that the evidence was not intentionally
withheld:
[Wlhether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the re-
sponsibility of the prosecutor. . . . To the extent this places a burden on the
large prosecution offices, procedures and regulations can be established to carry
that burden and to insure communication of all relevant information on each
case to every lawyer who deals with it. Id. at 154.
139. 406 U.S. at 468 n.*.
140. 378 U.S. at 102.
372 [Vol. 6
NOTES
The lower court decision in United States v. McDaniel'41 is illustrative
of the greater protection afforded by use and derivative use immunity
in the inter-jurisdictional situation. The factual situation in McDaniel
was substantially identical to that in Murphy. In both cases the federal
government was prosecuting a witness who had testified before a state
grand jury and had been given transactional immunity by the question-
ing jurisdiction. However, there was one crucial difference between
these cases. In McDaniel, the United States Attorney had obtained a
copy of McDaniel's state grand jury testimony before McDaniel had
been indicted by the federal government. Because of this single
difference, the court of appeals held that McDaniel should be immune
from federal prosecution for all the offenses related to his state grand
jury testimony.142  The court held that the federal prosecutor's receipt
of the defendant's state grand jury testimony constituted a "prima facie
'use' of the testimony which is prohibited by the Murphy exclusionary
rule.' 43  The court concluded that, when the government saw Mc-
Daniel's state grand jury testimony, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion had been violated because the witness and the federal government
were no longer in "substantially the same position as if the witness had
claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of immunity."' 44
If McDaniel "had 'claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant
of immunity,' there would be nothing for the federal government to
see."'14" In the Murphy situation, then, the United States Attorney who
subsequently prosecutes the state grand jury witness cannot be present
when the witness testifies before the state grand jury, nor can he have
access to such testimony. If he obtains access, as in the McDaniel case,
and makes any use of the information obtained, it would probably be
through "misconduct and collusion, a matter quite susceptible of
proof.'
146
In intra-jurisdictional cases like Kastigar, however, the prosecuting
authorities at a subsequent trial of the grand jury witness will un-
doubtedly have had access to the witness' grand jury testimony. 4 7 An
141. 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971).




146. Id. at 837-38.
147. Attorneys for the government, among others, may be present during the grand
jury proceedings. FED. R. CruM. P. 6(d). "Disclosure of matters occurring before
the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to
the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties." FED.
1973]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
obvious prospect is that, as the opportunities for access to the testimony
increase, the likelihood of a prohibited use also increases. Even as-
suming the absence of purposive activity on the part of the prosecuting
authorities, inadvertent reliance is a real threat which is not apparent in
an inter-jurisdictional case. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion in
Piccirillo v. New York,148 made the following comment regarding the
inevitability of this type of threat:
[A]II the relevant evidence will obviously be in the hands of the govern-
ment . . It assumes only the normal margin of human fallibility.
Men working in the same office or department exchange information
without recording carefully how they obtained certain information; it
is often impossible to remember in retrospect how or when or from
whom information was obtained. By hypothesis, the situation involves
one jurisdiction with presumably adequate exchange of information
among its various law enforcement officers. Moreover, the possibility
of subtle inferences drawn from action or non-action on the part of
fellow law enforcement personnel would be difficult if not impossible
to prove or disprove.
149
Commentators have suggested that to allow the government to learn
the details of the witness' involvement in a crime for which he can be
subsequently prosecuted greatly lessens the burden on the government
in our adversary system to build a case completely on its own.1 0 After
the witness testifies, the prosecuting attorney then knows whether a
case can be made against him and what evidence must be found from an
independent source. In most instances, the government possesses some
information concerning the involvement of the witness in criminal
activities prior to compelling his testimony. Nevertheless, the Kastigar
decision will undoubtedly create situations where "the decision to prose-
cute and therefore to create an independent source . . . would not have
been made" but for the additional information and assurance gained
from the compelled testimony.''
R. CIM. P. 6(e). There is nothing in either of these sections that would indicate that
the United States Attorney who interrogates a witness before the grand jury may not
subsequently handle the prosecution of that witness. Nor do these sections, or any
other sections of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, lead to the conclusion that
it is not permissible for the questioning attorney to release the records of the grand jury
testimony to a prosecuting attorney. Accordingly, it is evident that a prosecuting at-
torney will have access to a defendant's grand jury testimony.
148. 400 U.S. 548 (1971).
149. Id. at 568.
150. Reif, The Grand Jury Witness and Compulsory Testimony Legislation, 10
Am. CRiM. L. Rlv. 829, 856-57 (1972).
151. Id. at 57; see Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between The Privilege
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Specifically referring to the exclusion of evidence derived from
utilization of a witness' compelled testimony as an investigatory lead or
as a basis for focusing the investigation on the witness, the Kastigar
majority apparently believed that the burden of showing an independent
source would preclude such subtle uses.152 Justice Marshall, disagreeing,
characterized the majority's "comprehensive safeguard" as merely a
perfunctory burden met "by mere assertion if the witness produces no
contrary evidence."' 53  Interestingly, some commentators have viewed
the Murphy rule in an entirely different light and have contended that
it places an unduly onerous burden on the federal government, the
effect of which was overlooked by Justice Goldberg's conclusion in
Murphy that the rule "leaves the witness and the federal government in
substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege
in the absence of a state grant of immunity."' 54  These commentators
argue that, if no such immunity had been given, the federal government
could prosecute without overcoming any burden of showing that inde-
pendent evidence was used. But the conferral of such a grant of im-
munity will mean that the federal officers may not prosecute the witness
for the subject matter of his testimony unless they can demonstrate that
the evidence "is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent,
legitimate source for the disputed evidence."' 5 5 As one critic has
contended, a complete lack of taint would be very difficult to prove:
It would seem virtually impossible to discharge this burden of showing
that testimony known to an investigator did not influence him in conduct-
ing a search for evidence upon which to base a prosecution. Any court
faced with such facts will probably find, in most cases, that the prose-
cutor has failed to sustain that burden. Even in situations where a
prosecutor was preparing or had commenced an investigation, it would
be difficult to show that testimony about which he knew or should rea-
sonably have known did not influence the direction taken by his investi-
gation. And where no investigation had been undertaken before a wit-
ness testified, and investigation leading to prosecution was then com-
Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 SuP.
CT. REv. 103, 165. Apparently, if the compelled testimony were used as a basis for
deciding to prosecute, any so-called "independent source" found as a result of the
compelled testimony would not be "independent" under the majority's definition. 406
U.S. at 460.
152. 406 U.S. at 460.
153. Id. at 469.
154. 4 FRIEDMAN, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969,
THEIR LivEs AND MAJOR OPINIONS 289 (1969), quoting from Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
155. 378 U.S. at 79 n.18.
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menced, the burden could not be realistically discharged. The resulting
crippling limitation on the ability to prosecute could be more dangerous
than a limitation on the ability to investigate. 156
The failure of the Court, both in Murphy and Kastigar, to explicate
the precise scope and nature of the government's burden has created
this uncertainty. The generalities asserted in these decisions have left
innumerable questions to be answered before the operative constitution-
ality of use and derivative use immunity can be established. For ex-
ample, it is not at all clear whether absolutely all evidence linked to
a tainted source must be excluded or whether evidence which has
become attenuated from the source of the primary taint may be ad-
mitted. Nor is it known whether the government must demonstrate the
independent character of its evidence beyond a reasonable doubt or by
only a preponderance of the evidence.
The most definitive indication given by the Kastigar majority as to
the scope and nature of the government's burden was its analogy to the
exclusionary protection afforded in coerced confession cases."57  The
Court reasoned that since a coerced confession, which is as revealing of
leads as testimony given in exchange for immunity, does not bar a sub-
sequent prosecution, but is just inadmissible, then a fortiori a prosecu-
tion should not be barred simply because testimony was previously
compelled under an immunity statute.' 58  In fact, the Court argued,
a witness compelled to testify by a grant of immunity is in a stronger
position at trial than a defendant who gave a coerced confession since:
One raising a claim under this [immunity] statute need only show that
he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the govern-
ment the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to
use was derived from legitimate, independent sources. On the other
hand, a defendant raising a coerced-confession claim under the Fifth
Amendment must first prevail in a voluntariness hearing before his
confession and evidence derived therefrom become inadmissible. 15 9
The inference to be drawn is that the Court intended the exclusionary
rule to be applied similarly in both coerced confession cases and immu-
nity cases, both of which deal with the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
This interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of the
156. Note, Self-Incrimination and the States: Restriking the Balance, 73 YALU
L.J. 1491, 1495 (1964).
157. 406 U.S. at 461.
158. ld. at 462.
159. Id. at 461-62.
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immunity statute involved in Kastigar.1 ° Congressman Poff, who
introduced the bill in the House of Representatives, commented in sub-
committee hearings:
[Tihe immunity grant would constitute a ground for the suppression of
the use of compelled testimony and the fruits of that testimony, rather
than a total defense. It would be a use restriction, a use restriction sim-
ilar to the exclusionary rule which is now applied against such things as
involuntary confessions, evidence acquired from unlawful searches and
seizures, evidence acquired in violation of th& Miranda warnings, to cite
only a few examples. The witness could be prosecuted for his crime
under this bill, provided the evidence used against him is independent of
and untainted by the compelled testimony or its fruits."".
Presumably, Congress perceived the Murphy use restriction to be the
equivalent of the exclusionary protection afforded in coerced con-
fession and illegal search and seizure cases. Such an interpretation would
not protect against all possible incriminating evidentiary uses of the
witness' compelled testimony.
A leading case on the exclusion of evidence derived from coerced
confessions is Harrison v. United States.'62 The Harrison Court held
that neither a coerced confession nor any information derived therefrom
is admissible into evidence, but applied the Fourth Amendment's ex-
clusionary rule as developed in the case of Wong Sun v. United States65
to determine if the evidence used by the prosecution was independent
160. HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970, H.R. Rep. No.
91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
161. Hearings on H.R. 11157 and H.R. 12041 before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 30 (1969). Congress-
man Poff's suggestion that the same exclusionary rule should be applied in im-
munity cases as is applied in search and seizure cases and coerced confession cases
is based on his conclusion that, since the courts must decide "precisely the same prob-
lem" in each of these situations, we should apply the already developed case law of
search and seizure to this similar situation. Id. at 53. But see note 164 infra.
162. 392 U.S. 219 (1968). Harrison involved the issue of whether the use of de-
fendant's statements, given in a prior trial wherein coerced confessions had been ad-
mitted into evidence, amounted to "the inadmissible fruit of the illegally procured con-
fessions." Id. at 221.
163. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). It should be noted that, in the House committee report
on the bill containing the immunity provisions involved in the Kastigar case, Wong
Sun v. United States was cited as the present law regarding the protection to be
afforded a witness from use of evidence derivatively obtained:
It is designed to reflect the use-restriction immunity concept of Murphy v. Water-
front Commission rather (sic) the transaction immunity concept of Counselman v.
Hitchcock. The witness is also protected against the use of evidence derivatively
obtained. The statutory language is phrased in the terms of present law. See
Wong Sun v. United States. (Citations omitted). HousE REPORT ON ORGANIZED
CRAE CONTROL ACT OF 1970, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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of the defendant's compelled testimony.16 4 The rule pronounced in
Wong Sun was that evidence may be admissible even when it would
not have been exposed but for the primarily illegality:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the
police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, grant-
ing establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint." 65
It is this part of the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" which makes
the exclusionary rule inadequate when applied to immunity cases. The
164. This application of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination ignores the critical differences between
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the different purposes served by the exclusion
of evidence under these amendments.
The primary purpose -of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases is to
insure the right of privacy by deterring improper police conduct through the removal
of any incentive to disregard the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207
(1960). In the case of Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), the Court
explained that the "single and distinct" purpose of the exclusionary rule in Fourth
Amendment cases is to deter future police misconduct. Id. at 413.
In contrast, the primary import of the Fifth Amendment is to protect an individual
from becoming a witness against himself. As the Court stated in Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896), "the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
not to aid the witness in vindicating his character but to protect him against being
compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal charge." The exclusion of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is an incomplete remedy
which does not purge the unconstitutional nature of the police misconduct. On the
other hand, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government from invading
an individual's privacy by compelling him to testify against his will. Rather, it pro-
hibits incriminating uses of such testimony, while only incidentally circumscribing
government conduct. The issue of deterrence is of little concern in Fifth Amendment
cases and the efficacy of the amendment is judged by its success in preventing self-
incrimination and not by its deterrent effect.
Notably, the Fourth Amendment does not expressly require the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained by an illegal search and seizure. However, when the amendment's
prohibition was endangered by continual violations, the Court, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), interpreted the amendment to require the exclusion of any evidence
seized contrary to its terms. Thus, the exclusionary rule applied in Fourth Amend-
ment cases is merely a method by which the constitutional prohibition is enforced and
is not part of the amendment's inherent guarantee. See id. at 656. To be distinguished,
however, is the exclusionary protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination. It is the preclusion of incriminating uses that is the
essence of the privilege; the exclusion is not just a method to implement some other
constitutional right.
165. 371 U.S. at 487-88 (emphasis added).
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Murphy burden demands that no testimony or information derived
from it be used against the witness. It does not include the qualification
"unless 'sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"
Whether the Kastigar Court intended to incorporate this attenuation
doctrine as a limitation on a use and derivative use immunity grant was
left unanswered.
Similarly, the Court was silent as to whether its analogy was intended
to delineate the nature of the burden of proof imposed on the prosecuting
authorities. Prior to the Murphy decision, it was generally assumed that
transactional immunity was constitutionally required and therefore this
issue did not arise. Subsequent to Murphy, however, lower courts have
had the opportunity to comment on the Murphy burden, generally con-
cluding:
[T]he burden would be on the Government to prove, clearly and con-
vincingly, that all of its proof is derived from sources completely inde-
pendent of the [witness'] grand jury testimony, and any clues or leads
derived from such testimony. 166
However, if Justice Powell's analogy to the exclusionary rule in coerced
confession cases is construed by the lower courts to require the same
magnitude of proof for determining whether there has been derivative
use of immunized testimony as is used in pre-trial voluntariness hearings,
the recent case of Lego v. Twomey, Warden167 would define the nature
of the burden of proof required for the government to demonstrate the
independent nature of its evidence. The Lego Court held that a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard should be applied to determine
whether or not the defendant's confession was voluntarily given.
168
Applying this standard to immunity cases, the prosecutor would need
only show by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no deriva-
tive use of the witness' immunized testimony. The Lego Court specifi-
cally rejected the petitioner's contention that a "reasonable doubt"
standard is of vital importance to the protection of the values underlying
the Fifth Amendment. 16 9 Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall,
dissenting in Lego, argued that the preponderance standard did not
provide sufficient protection against the use of involuntary confessions
at trial, and that a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard should be
166. United States v. Pappadio, 235 F. Supp. 887, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (emphasis
added), aff'd., 346 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); see United States v. Birrell, 269 F. Supp.
716, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
167. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
168. Id. at 489.
169. Id. at 487-88.
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applied.'17  Several lower federal courts are in accord with the im-
position of this stricter reasonable doubt standard.'1
7
The Court's exclusionary rule analogy suggests further disquieting
possibilities in addition to those relating to the nature and scope of
the government's burden to show an independent source. There is a
noticeable trend on the part of the Court to strictly circumscribe the
exclusionary protection afforded in coerced confession cases. The
decision in Harris v. New York 72 is illustrative of this trend. In Harris,
an otherwise voluntary confession was ruled inadmissible in the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief because the defendant had not been informed of his
right to counsel and his right to remain silent. The Court, however,
held that the confession was admissible for the purpose of attacking
the credibility of the defendant's trial testimony. 173  There is no language
in Kastigar to preclude the extension of the Harris rule to allow the use
of testimony acquired under a grant of immunity to impeach subsequent
trial testimony.
Justice Marshall severely criticized the majority's reliance on the ex-
clusionary rule analogy: "An immunity statute . . . is much more
ambitious than any exclusionary rule."'174 Justice Marshall characterized
the exclusionary protection provided in coerced confession cases as
a necessarily limited judicial remedy provided to ameliorate the po-
sition of a witness who has been unconstitutionally compelled to in-
criminate himself: "If an unconstitutional interrogation or search were
held to create transactional immunity, that might well be regarded as an
excessively high price to pay for the 'constable's blunder.' ",17 The
availability of such partial protection, however, is not intended to purge
170. Id. at 494. In their opinion, the preponderance standard does not provide
sufficient protection against the danger of the use of involuntary confessions at trial.
The stafidard of proof required for a showing of voluntariness should be the same
standard required for criminal convictions. They concluded that the command of the
Fifth Amendment is that it is worse to convict an innocent man or permit involuntary
self-condemnation than it is to, respectively, let a guilty man go free or deprive a jury
of probative evidence. Id. at 494-95.
171. Two federal courts have held, as an exercise of their supervisory powers, that
voluntariness must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d
786, 793 (4th Cir. 1970); Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1968); cf.
United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), af 'd, 412 F.2d 1262
(2d Cir. 1968) (court required the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that certain evidence was not derived from illegally seized evidence).
172. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
173. Id. at 226.
174. 406 U.S. at 470.
175. Id. at 471.
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or sanction the unconstitutional government action. 1'7 A grant of
immunity, on the other hand, represents a reasoned and constitutionally
approved decision to interrogate an otherwise privileged witness. While
the exclusionary rule is intended to deter unconstitutional conduct,
a grant of immunity encourages an interrogation which otherwise would
violate the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, Justice Marshall con-
cluded that a more demanding standard than that indicated by the
majority's analogy to the exclusionary rule was needed to supplant the
privilege.
1'77
There are other problems in addition to those raised by the ex-
clusionary rule analogy. Although the immunity statute literally pre-
cludes the use of "any information' derived from the compelled testi-
mony,' 78 the Kastigar opinion, as did earlier decisions, defined the ex-
clusionary protection afforded by this statute as prohibiting only the
use of evidence derived from the compelled testimony.17 9  However, as
one commentator has noted,8 0 evidentiary uses are not the only ad-
vantages gained from compelling a witness to testify by granting him
immunity. One example of the non-evidentiary or strategic advantages
gained by compelling a witness' testimony is the opportunity it affords
to obtain complete pretrial discovery of the defense case and defense
strategy. An extensive grand jury interrogation would bring out the
strengths and weaknesses of the witness' case, information which un-
doubtedly would be useful in a subsequent prosecution. Moreover, the
prosecution's trial strategy could be affected by information disclosed in
the compelled testimony. For example, such information could aid in
deciding whether to impeach the witness if he should testify at a subse-
quent trial, in structuring the prosecutor's opening statement and order
of presentation of evidence and witnesses, and in providing a basis for
objection to particular questions asked of witnesses by defense counsel.
176. Directing attention to the purpose of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amend-
ment and Fifth Amendment coerced confession cases, Justice Marshall noted:
The constitutional violation remains, and may provide the basis for other relief,
such as a civil action for damages (see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971)), or a criminal prosecution of the responsible officers (see
18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242). The Constitution does not authorize police officers to
coerce confessions or to invade privacy without cause, so long as no use is made of
the evidence they obtain. But this Court has held that the Constitution does au-
thorize the government to compel a witness to give potentially incriminating
testimony, so long as no incriminating use is made of the resulting evidence.
Id. at 470-71.
177. Id.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970); see note 10 supra.
179. 406 U.S. at 459-61.
180. Reif, The Grand Jury Witness and Compulsory Testimony Legislation, 10 AM.
CRiM. L. Rlv. 829, 857-58 (1972).
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Significantly, the defense would have no corresponding right to such
broad discovery.' 81
If such strategic advantages are not taken away from the prosecution,
then the witness is not put in the same position as he would have been
in had he not been compelled to testify. However, even assuming such
non-evidentiary uses are encompassed within the Kastigar Court's in-
terpretation of prohibited uses, the Court failed to delineate a procedure
which would adequately ferret out such subtle uses.182  Perhaps such
181. See note 132 supra.
182. The Kastigar Court made very few comments concerning the enforcement of
the prohibition: (1) it must ensure that absolutely no use is made of the compelled
testimony against the witness; (2) use of the testimony as an investigatory lead or
acquisition of evidence as a result of focusing an investigation on a particular witness
is forbidden; (3) any evidence introduced against the witness at a subsequent trial
must be derived from an independent source; and (4) the prosecuting authorities have
the affirmative burden of showing an independent source. 406 U.S. at 460. These
are the only clues which are given as to how the prohibition will be enforced. One
can only speculate from them as to the prohibition's precise application. Certain pro-
cedural safeguards should be adopted when use and derivative use immunity is granted
in order to ensure that absolutely no use is made of the compelled testimony against
the witness.
First, the prosecution should have to establish the independence of its evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the highest burden of proof which can be imposed
short of excluding all evidence. It strikes a balance between the witness' Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and the legitimate interests of law enforce-
ment in obtaining information from the witness. This is a familiar standard in
criminal cases and one which some jurisdictions have already adopted in applying the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir.
1968); United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). A less demanding
standard would increase the danger of a secret or undetected use of the compelled
testimony.
Second, different statutory presumptions of taint should be established according
to the date on which the challenged evidence is received. A system should be de-
veloped whereby the prosecution can certify the information which it has at the time
of the granting of immunity. This certified evidence should have the presumption of
being prima facie untainted. Any evidence obtained after the witness testifies or that
was not certified should have a rebuttable presumption of taint. Such an approach is
implicitly suggested by 18 U.S.C. § 6004(b) (3) (1970). This section provides that
no immunity may be granted prior to giving 10 days notice to the Attorney General
of the United States. The function of this section is to provide the Attorney General
with sufficient time to gather the information and evidence necessary for a successful
prosecution of the witness before the immunized testimony is actually given. See
NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERs 1406 (1970).
Third, the prosecutor should be obliged to swear that he has not used the compelled
testimony or any information derived from it. At the hearing on the motion to sup-
press the evidence, the prosecutor and other investigative personnel should be ques-
tioned by the court and by defense counsel to determine the source of the evidence.
This would hopefully reduce the risk of inadvertent use by encouraging the prosecutor's
office to adopt internal checks and procedures to protect against such unknowing uses.
NOTES
disquieting considerations prompted the Court to conclude that, in order
for a grant of immunity to be coexstensive with the Fifth Amendment
privilege, it need only leave "the witness and the prosecutorial authorities
in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the
Fifth Amendment privilege."' 8
Ostensibly, the statute upheld in Kastigar was intended to assist the
government in combating criminal activity. If, however, Justice
Marshall's prediction is correct and lower courts will allow the govern-
ment to meet its burden by mere assertion that its evidence is inde-
pendently derived, 84 it will be difficult to convince any potential wit-
ness that by testifying he will not be taking a substantial risk of incrimina-
ting himself. Under such circumstances, the impact of the Kastigar
decision could severely hinder the government in its efforts to obtain
evidence and information necessary to successfully prosecute certain
types of criminal activity (e.g., organized crime) .185 For, if it appears
in practice that supposedly immunized testimony can be used to ad-
versely affect a witness, then the alternative of refusing to testify and
being jailed for contempt may prove to be more acceptable. At the
very least, a witness who is compelled to testify will be less likely to
fully disclose any information which he might possess.
Hal M. Koontz
Jeffrey C. Stodel
The court could also call other witnesses to corroborate the testimony given.
See also notes 132, 137-38 supra.
183. 406 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 469.
185. Interestingly, the representative of the Attorney General of the United States
in testifying before a subcommittee for the House Committee on the Judiciary stated:
As a practical matter, where the witness has elected to testify under this statute,
and he has been used, it would be a most unusual circumstance for the Government
that used him to turn around and prosecute him. You have coupled with that-
irrespective of the statute-the agreement not to prosecute. Hearings on H.R.
11157 and H.R. 12041 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 47 (1970).
See notes 134-38 supra and accompanying text.
19731
